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 In the last issue of Public Policy Review Sarah Birch argued that Britain should 
make voting compulsory, and that the law should actively enforce legal duties to turnout 
at elections.1 She argues that ‘governments need to have democratic legitimacy to pull 
countries through difficult times’, and that low turnout threatens that legitimacy. 
Moreover, she claims, ‘economic stress exacerbates perceptions of social inequality’, and 
suggests that if alienated groups do not see Parliament as a means to improve their lot, 
they will turn to extra-parliamentary ways of doing so.   
 
 These arguments rest an enormous weight on high levels of voting at elections, 
and overlook the fact that if enough people vote for the opposition, high turnout may 
undermine, rather than enhance, the legitimacy of a government. Fortunately, the crux of 
Birch’s argument is that commitments to political fairness, social fairness and procedural 
fairness require Britain to adopt mandatory voting, and these look more plausible. 
Nonetheless, as we will see, they fail to justify compulsory voting or turnout. 
 
The Democratic Case for Compulsory Voting 
 
 The heart of the democratic case for compulsory voting, which Birch summarises 
in her article, is that equality, fairness and legitimacy require voting to be compulsory, 
not voluntary.2 Voluntary electoral turnout in advanced democracies has tended to fall 
quite dramatically since the Second World War, and declining turnout exacerbates 
disparities in turnout between more and less socially favoured groups, because it is the 
youngest, least educated and least wealthy who are least likely to vote.  
 
 The key steps in the argument, then, are these: first, that declining and unequal 
turnout threatens the legitimacy of democratic governments, and makes it harder for the 
political left to get elected.  Second, that while there are a variety of ways to raise turnout, 
compulsory voting is the only means both to raise and to equalise turnout, and to do so 
immediately.  Third, proponents argue, compulsory voting threatens no fundamental 
                                                 
1 S. Birch, ‘The Case For Compulsory Voting’, PPR  March-May 2009, 21 - 27. 
2 Not all arguments for compulsory voting are democratic in intent or justification.  Arend Lijphart is the 
inspiration for the contemporary discussion of its social democratic potential.  A. Lijphart, ‘Unequal 
Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma’, American Political Science Review, 91.2. (1997) 1 - 14. 
The IPPR report on compulsory voting picks up and applies his arguments to the British case. E. Kearney 
and B. Rogers, ‘A Citizens’ Duty: Voter Inequality and the Case for Compulsory Turnout’, Institute of 
Public Policy Report (2006), available at www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports .   
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liberties, because the legal duty is to turnout, not to cast a valid vote.3  Finally, they 
argue, non-voters are free-riding on voters, and are therefore behaving unfairly and 
immorally.  
 
  I have presented and evaluated these arguments in more detail elsewhere.4  The 
gist of my concerns are these: (1) while we do have moral duties to vote in some 
circumstances, and sometimes even to vote one way rather than another, citizens are 
under no moral obligation to vote at all elections. Consequently there is no moral duty to 
vote that would justify legal compulsion to turn out at election time. (2) It is also doubtful 
that compulsory turnout does anything to increase people’s interest in electoral politics, 
knowledge about it, or faith in those involved in it.5  So while compulsory voting can 
certainly remove the most obvious symptoms of political alienation, it seems incapable of 
addressing its causes and may well exacerbate them.  I will briefly explain these 
objections to compulsory voting before reflecting on where this leaves us. 
 
The Democratic Case Against    
 
 According to Birch ‘current electoral events fail to grant everyone equal voice, 
because they fail to record all voices.  And without a record of everyone’s view, it is not 
possible to formulate a collective view that reflects the perspectives of all citizens’.  Were 
this true, we would have to wonder whether political equality was really desirable, 
because it would certainly be impossible.  Not even compulsory voting secures 100% 
voting by those eligible to vote.  In fact, once you allow for disparities in registration, 
there may not be much difference in turnout between Australia and the UK.6  Fortunately, 
the point of democratic elections is to enable people to choose a government, not to voice 
their political opinions, their dissent, their hopes, aspirations, or convictions.  We do not 
need to participate in an election in order to express ourselves politically or to express 
                                                 
3 As a general matter, this means something like ticking your name off an electoral role and then going 
home without voting.  This used to happen in the Netherlands, before they abandoned compulsory voting in 
the 1970s. There is no such provision in Australia or many of the countries that actually make voting 
legally compulsory.  How compulsory turnout is meant to increase the legitimacy of a government escapes 
me; nor do I see how it supports faith in democracy. Compulsory turnout is not easier to justify than 
compulsory voting, it is actually harder to justify. The case for compulsory turnout is parasitic on 
arguments for compulsory voting, but then needs an explanation for why some people should be required to 
‘turnout’, and some explanation of whether this is meant to supplement or replace legal exemptions for 
conscientious objection.   
4 A. Lever, ‘Is Compulsory Voting Justified?’ Public Reason 1 (1) 45 - 62. available at 
http://www.publicreason.ro/home.  I also have a short article, ‘Liberalism, Democracy and the Ethics of 
Voting’, forthcoming in Politics 29 (3) 223-227.(Oct. 2009), and a longer article, ‘Compulsory Voting: A 
Critical Perspective’ forthcoming in the British Journal of Political Science 40 (1) Jan. 2010 (manuscript 
available on request, or available to download from www.alever.net ). 
5 P. Selb and R. Lachat ‘The More, the Better? Counterfactual Evidence on the Effect of Compulsory 
Voting on the Consistency of Party Choice’ in European Journal of Political Research  48.5. (2009) 573-
597; B. Engelhen and M. Hooghe, ‘Compulsory Voting and its Effects on Political Participation, Interest 
and Efficacy’, Unpublished Paper presented to the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop on ‘Compulsory 
Voting: Principles and Practice’, May 7 - 12 (2007), Heksinki, Finland; C. Ballinger, ‘Compulsory 
Turnout: A Solution to Disengagement?’ in Democracy and Voting, ed. C. Ballinger, (Hansard Society 
Democracy Series, London, 2002), 5-22. 
6 C. Ballinger, supra. 
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ourselves effectively. Nor can electoral participation fulfil all our needs for political 
expression. That is why the right to vote is no substitute for rights to other forms of 
political choice, expression and association.  
 
  Once one grants that the main point of elections is to choose governments from 
those parties or individuals competing for power, it becomes apparent both that we 
generally lack a duty to vote in national (or other) elections, and often have reasons to 
abstain. We typically lack a duty to vote because, in established democracies, any of the 
major parties could form a morally acceptable government, and claim our allegiance if 
elected.  That is why Labour voters can feel bound to accept a duly elected Conservative 
government, and vice-versa.  This makes it hard to see that there is a general duty to vote: 
for the non-partisan may, quite reasonably, believe that the similarities between the main 
candidates for office - qua democrats - are more significant than their partisan 
differences. So people may have no moral duty to vote, even if they have no 
conscientious objections to doing so.  
 
 Things are obviously different where there is a likelihood of electing a racist 
candidate - let alone a racist government.  There, I believe, most of us have a duty to vote 
and to vote strategically, not sincerely.7  Moreover, it is sometimes the case that elections 
are clearly focused on one or two critical questions, of defining importance for the future 
of our country, or for other countries.  In such cases, we may be morally bound to vote 
unless we have conscientious reasons to abstain.  As a general matter, however, 
democratic elections are not of that sort, and voters may therefore have no moral reason 
to prefer one candidate to another.  
  
 Some people think that elections are not just about choosing a government, but 
about showing our support for democracy itself, or affirming the legitimacy of our 
political system.  This idea underpins the claim that those who do not vote are ‘free-
riding’ on the democratic efforts of voters, and can therefore be legally required to 
turnout at election time, even if it would be morally wrong to force them to vote.8 A 
democratic government and political system is a public good, in that we all get to enjoy 
its benefits whether or not we do our part to support it.  Just as we can be required to pay 
our taxes, serve on juries and help in the defence of our country, so it might seem, we can 
                                                 
7 I say ‘most of us’ have such a duty, in order to leave open the possibility that the BNP, despite its racist 
platform, can be the legitimate receptacle of protest votes aimed at established parties.  But if some people 
are morally entitled to vote BNP this means that most us who have no such justification, may have quite 
stringent duties to vote against them, which may well mean voting strategically, not sincerely - as the 
French so successfully did in local mayoral elections recently. 
8 In Australia, so it seems, registered voters are legally required to cast a valid ballot, unless they qualify for 
an exemption.  The government, however, has successfully fought attempts to publish the grounds for legal 
exemptions.  There is, therefore, no way of knowing precisely what they are nor, importantly, of whether 
they exemptions are fairly granted or not. L. Hill, ‘Compulsory Voting in Australia: History, Public 
Acceptance and Justifiability’, Unpublished Paper presented to the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop on 
‘Compulsory Voting: Principles and Practice’, Helsinki, May 7 - 12 (2007). Belgium recently announced 
that it will no longer fine or imprison those who fail to turn up to vote.  
http://www.nrc.nl/buitenland/article2263399.ece/Belgie_vervolgt_niet-stemmers_niet_meer.  (Dr. 
Alex Voorhoeve of the LSE sent me this link, and told me what it says, as I don’t read Dutch ).  
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be required to participate in elections: because we all stand to gain from democratic 
government, but will often be tempted to avoid its burdens.  
  
 Democratic elections are, certainly, a public good and an important one. But is 
non-voting the equivalent of free-riding, or of unfairly seeking to benefit from the efforts 
and sacrifices of others?  Political realism suggests that it is not. Whatever is wrong with 
not-voting, it cannot be that non-voters are selfishly exploiting the idealism, energy and 
public-spirited efforts of the BNP and their ilk.  Nor are they exploiting self-interested 
voters, however respectable and democratic the parties for which they voted.  It is not 
obvious, either, that they are exploiting altruistic voters simply because they are not 
helping them.  When abstention is morally wrong, therefore, this seems to be because of 
its consequences for those who are incapable of voting – whether because they are too 
old, too young, because they are foreign, not yet born and so on- rather than because it is 
unfair to compatriots who voted. In either case, however, compulsory voting is 
unjustified.  It may be morally wrong to abstain, but morally wrongful abstention may not 
be especially harmful.  Such harms as it causes, moreover, can be caused by careless, 
ignorant and prejudiced voting. So, from the fact that non-voting is sometimes immoral, 
we cannot conclude that people are under a general obligation to vote, let alone that 
compulsory voting/ turnout is justified as a way to prevent or to punish immorality.   
 
 
 It is, then, hard to justify compulsory voting on democratic grounds, even if we 
ignore those with conscientious objections to voting, and the practicalities of 
enforcement. We can be morally wrong to abstain from voting; but we can also be 
morally wrong to vote the way we do.  Off-hand, there is no reason to suppose that the 
former more troubling than the other, morally or politically. Nor should we overlook the 
fact that democratic politics is a competitive as well as a cooperative business, and this 
makes the ethics of voting - and of political morality more generally - far more complex 
than proponents of compulsion suppose.  Even if we vote and are morally right to do so, 
we may be morally obliged to accept someone else as our legitimate government. We 
may also be morally required to vote strategically, rather than sincerely, and there is a 
longstanding debate amongst political philosophers about how far self-interest, the 
national interest, personal preferences, identities and loyalties should determine our 
votes.  It is not surprising, then, that we generally lack a duty to vote - because we may be 
morally permitted to do a number of different, even contradictory, things in an election.  
 
 This does not mean that voting - or democracy more generally- are unimportant.  
It does mean that we need a more nuanced and sophisticated view of the place of national 
elections in democratic politics. Elections decide which of several candidates for 
government are entitled to our allegiance.  Beyond that, it is notoriously hard to know 
what an election ‘means’, or what voters ‘said’.  We should therefore beware of asking 
elections to bear more moral and political weight than they can withstand - whether in 
terms of legitimising political programmes, particular acts, or even particular people.  By 
themselves, elections rarely justify confident claims about the popular support, let alone 
the legitimacy, of any of these.  Instead, it is in conjunction with other things - 
subsequent decisions by elected and appointed bodies and interest groups; protests and 
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discussion by citizens; even repeated polls - that popularity and/or legitimacy are 
conferred on the actions, policies and personnel of governments with an electoral 
mandate to rule.  
 
   In short, a preoccupation with national elections over other ways for citizens to 
govern themselves sits uneasily with social-democratic commitments to empowering 
citizens, as well as with participatory ideals of democracy.  Social democrats should 
certainly be concerned with current alienation from electoral parties and politics.  But 
self-government cannot be reduced to participation in national elections every few years, 
whatever the forms of voting or representation involved, and whatever the precise 
constitution and balance of powers. 9  
 
 Indeed, our failure to explain what else democracy might involve seems to 
underpin the disenchantment with established parties found in all established 
democracies.10 At a time when, in Britain, we are rightly preoccupied with constitutional 
questions and the merits of different types of electoral system, it is as well to remind 
ourselves that the ability to empower and legitimise governments is one of many reasons 
to care about democracy, and only one of many ways for us to act as citizens. 
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